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I consider a repeated principal-agent model with moral hazard, in which the agent has ￿￿-
preferences, which are widely used to capture time-inconsistency. I ￿rst analyze the case where
the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting.
I characterize the optimal wage scheme for such an agent and compare it to time-consistent
benchmarks. The marginal cost of rewarding the agent for high output today exceeds the
marginal bene￿t of delaying these rewards until tomorrow. In this sense, the principal does not
smooth the agent￿ s rewards over time. When facing a sophisticated agent, it is optimal for the
principal to reward the good performance more and punish the bad performance more in the
early period, relative to the optimal wage scheme for a time-consistent agent. I also consider
the case where the agent is naive in the sense that he is not aware of his time-inconsistency. I
show that the principal￿ s maximum utility is the same from a sophisticated agent and a naive
agent.
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11 Introduction
There is a considerable amount of evidence showing that agents￿behavior often exhibits time-
inconsistency. When the bene￿ts of an action are in the future and the costs are immediate, agents
do not give the bene￿ts much weight. That is, they tend to postpone costly actions and tough
projects (e.g. ￿nishing up writing a paper, ￿ling taxes or going to the gym), but rarely tend to
postpone grati￿cation.1 Although a substantial amount of work has been done regarding individ-
ual decision making under time-inconsistency, there is little work done on economic interactions
that include time-inconsistent individuals. In particular, a natural question is how a dynamically
consistent principal would contract with an agent who has time-inconsistent preferences.
The focus of the current paper is on the repeated principal-agent problem where there is moral
hazard, with the standard trade-o⁄ between incentives and insurance.2 I depart from the stan-
dard repeated moral hazard literature in allowing the agent￿ s preferences to be time-inconsistent,
speci￿cally present-biased. The contribution of this paper is to characterize the e⁄ects of time-
inconsistency on the optimal contract and on the principal￿ s expected pro￿ts. I show that if the
agent is aware of his time-inconsistency, the principal does not smooth the agent￿ s rewards over
time. It is optimal for the principal to provide the agent with more incentives in the earlier period
and less in the later period, relative to the optimal wage scheme for a time-consistent agent. Also,
the principal achieves the same expected pro￿t from a time-inconsistent agent who is fully aware
of his inconsistency and a time-inconsistent agent who is not aware of his inconsistency.
The agent￿ s time-inconsistency is modeled by ￿￿-preferences.3 An agent with ￿￿-preferences
has a discount factor ￿￿ between the current and the next period, and ￿ between any other pair
of successive periods. In other words, the agent￿ s preferences for a payo⁄ in date t over a payo⁄
in date t + 1 is stronger as date t gets closer. A time-inconsistent agent may or may not be aware
of his inconsistency. A sophisticated agent is fully aware of his consistency in the sense that he
correctly predicts how his future selves will behave. A naive agent is not aware of his inconsistency,
in the sense that he mispredicts the behavior of his future selves through an overestimated ￿:
The principal is not able to observe the e⁄ort levels picked by the risk-averse agent; thus, she
1See Frederick, Loewenstein, O￿ Donoghue (2002), for an exensive overview of the literature.
2See, for instance, Rogerson (1985) and Lambert (1983).
3￿￿-preferences are ￿rst developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and later used by Laibson (1997), O￿ Donoghue
and Rabin (1999a,1999b,2001).
2faces the natural trade-o⁄ between smoothing risk and providing incentives. The principal o⁄ers a
wage scheme to the agent ensuring that he accepts it in the contracting stage, period 0; and exerts
high e⁄ort in both of the two periods, 1 and 2; following the contracting stage. The wage scheme
exhibits memory in the sense that the wages paid in period 2 depend on the performance in period
1.
When the agent is sophisticated, the principal does not intertemporally smooth the agent￿ s
rewards. More precisely, the marginal cost of rewarding the agent today exceeds the marginal
bene￿t of delaying these rewards until tomorrow for a high level of output and vice versa for a
low level of output. This is because the agent￿ s discount factor is changing over time. In contrast
the optimal contract for a time-consistent agent smoothes wages in this sense. Moreover, in the
earlier period a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent receives bigger rewards for good performance
and bigger punishments for bad performance under the optimal wage scheme, relative to a time-
consistent agent. The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose that the principal has two
options for the sophisticated agent: She can either increase the incentives in period 1 or increase
them in period 2, relative to the optimal contract for the time-consistent agent. To achieve the
same overall incentives, the increase in period 2 must be bigger, because period 2 is discounted more
by the agent. But the agent￿ s individual rationality holds with slack under the former increase if it
binds under the latter increase. This is because the agent discounts both changes to the contracting
stage at the same rate since there is no payment made in the contracting stage. Thus, the principal
can increase the wage di⁄erential in period 1, relative to the optimal scheme for the time-consistent
agent, and still ensure that the agent accepts the contract.
When comparing the expected pro￿t from a sophisticated agent to the one from a time-
consistent agent, since the sophisticated agent discounts at either ￿￿ or ￿; there are two benchmark
time-consistent agents, one with a discount factor ￿ and one with a discount factor ￿￿. So I com-
pare the expected pro￿t from a sophisticated agent to that from these two time-consistent agents:
The principal is better o⁄ with a time-consistent agent with a discount factor ￿ than with the
sophisticated time-inconsistent agent, who in turn is better than a time-consistent agent with a
discount factor ￿￿; under a mild condition: This makes sense because the sophisticated agent with
￿￿-preferences has an overall discount factor between ￿ and ￿￿:
With a naive agent the principal￿ s problem is more involved because she can deceive the agent
3and potentially get information rents. First, I show that whenever the principal wants to implement
high e⁄ort, the degree of the naivete of the agent, measured by the di⁄erence between the true ￿
and his overestimated ￿; does not play a role. Moreover, the principal, implementing high e⁄ort
in both periods, is indi⁄erent between facing a naive agent and facing a sophisticated agent. This
is particularly striking because with a naive time-inconsistent agent the principal can choose to
deceive the agent. However, such an opportunity to manipulate does not provide the principal with
higher pro￿ts and in the optimal contract the principal chooses not to deceive the agent at all.
This paper is related to a number of other papers in the literature. Rogerson (1985) considers a
repeated moral hazard problem with a time-consistent agent, and shows that the optimal contract
exhibits memory and that the marginal cost of rewarding the agent today equals the marginal ben-
e￿t of delaying these rewards to tomorrow. Chade, Prokopovych and Smith (2008) study in￿nitely
repeated games where players have ￿￿-preferences. They characterize the equilibrium payo⁄s and
show that the equilibrium payo⁄ set is not monotonic in ￿ or ￿: O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999b)
and Gilpatric (2003) both consider principal-agent relationship with time-inconsistent agents. The
former introduces a moral hazard problem in the form of unobservable task-cost realizations and
assumes that the agent is risk-neutral. The latter focuses on a contracting problem with time-
inconsistent agents assuming that pro￿t is fully determined by the e⁄ort, so e⁄ort is e⁄ectively
observable. The current paper distinguishes itself from these papers by allowing the trade-o⁄ be-
tween risk and incentives. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) characterize the optimal menu of contracts
when a monopoly is contracting with time-inconsistent agents and show that it includes exploitative
contracts for naive agents.
2 The Model
I consider a ￿nitely repeated moral hazard problem. A principal is contracting with an agent to
work on a two period project. Each period the agent can exert costly e⁄ort. The principal cannot
observe the e⁄ort choices of the agent. The project, in each period, has an output which is publicly
observed. The output in each period is stochastic and a⁄ected by the e⁄ort level picked by the
agent in that period.
42.1 Timing
Unlike the standard two-period repeated moral hazard problem, there is need for at least three
periods for the agent￿ s time-inconsistent preferences to play a role. Consider the following timing
of events:
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
principal o⁄ers a contract agent exerts e⁄ort, e1 agent exerts e⁄ort, e2
agent accepts or rejects output is realized, q1 output is realized, q2
wage is paid to agent, w1 wage is paid to agent, w2
More precisely:
￿ At t = 0, a contract, which is a wage scheme, is o⁄ered to the agent by the principal. Then
the agent accepts or rejects. If she rejects, the game ends and both the principal and the
agent get zero utility.4 If she accepts, they move on to the next period.
￿ At t = 1, the agent chooses an e⁄ort level, e1; which is not observed by the principal. The
output, q1; is realized which is observable by both the agent and the principal. The wage
payment, w1(q1); is made to the agent.
￿ At t = 2, the agent chooses an e⁄ort level, e2; which is not observed by the principal. The
output, q2; is realized which is observable by both the agent and the principal. The wage
payment, w2(q1;q2); is made to the agent.
In the contracting stage, t = 0; there is no e⁄ort decision. The only decision made by the agent
is to accept or reject the contract o⁄ered by the principal. We can think of this as getting a job o⁄er
in March but starting in September, just as most economics Ph.D. candidates experience. Thus
we have three periods with two e⁄ort decisions. I also assume that once the contract is accepted
at t = 0, both agent and principal are committed to the contract until the end of period 2. That
is, I focus on long-term contracts and abstract from renegotiation issues.
4To justify this zero-outside option assumption, assume that the outside option has also a lag in payment. Then
it would be natural to normalize the outside option utility to zero.
52.2 Agent
There are two e⁄ort levels, 0 and 1; and two outcomes, qh and ql with qh > ql: The agent receives
utility u(w) from the wage w, and disutility  (e) from exerting e⁄ort e: He is risk-averse, that is,
u0 > 0; u00 < 0: The disutility from exerting e⁄ort is given by  (1) =   and  (0) = 0; where   > 0:
The agent has additively separable preferences, so, his net utility in period t 2 f1;2g is given by
vt = u(wt) ￿  (et):





The discount factor between the current period and the next period is ￿￿; but the discount
factor between two adjacent periods in the future is ￿: The agent is time-consistent (exponential
discounter) when ￿ = 1; and time-inconsistent (quasi-hyperbolic discounter) when ￿ < 1: A time-
inconsistent agent can be fully aware, partially aware or fully unaware of his time inconsistency.
Denote the agent￿ s belief about his true ￿ by b ￿: As in the literature, we say that a time-inconsistent
agent is sophisticated when he is fully aware of his inconsistency, that is, when b ￿ = ￿ < 1. We say
the agent is partially naive when ￿ < b ￿ < 1 and fully naive agent when ￿ < b ￿ = 1. When we say
the agent is naive, we mean ￿ < b ￿ ￿ 1:
Denote the probability of getting high output under high e⁄ort, e = 1 by Pr(q = qhje = 1) = p1
and the probability of getting high output under low e⁄ort, e = 0 by Pr(q = qhje = 0) = p0; where
I assume p1 > p0:
There is no lending or borrowing. So the agent spends whatever wage he earns in a period
within that period. I also assume away limited liability.
2.3 Principal
The principal is risk-neutral, time-consistent and has a discount factor, ￿P. She knows what type
of agent she is facing. That is, she knows whether the agent is time-consistent, sophisticated, fully
naive or partially naive. However, she cannot observe the e⁄ort levels exerted by the agent as in
the standard moral hazard problem. We assume that high e⁄ort level is highly valuable for the
principal, so she wants to implement high e⁄ort in each period. The principal￿ s problem is to ￿nd
6an individually rational and incentive compatible contract which speci￿es wages in both periods for
all possible output realizations. That is, she maximizes her expected pro￿t subject to individual
rationality and incentive compatibility, over all possible contracts, fwi;wijgi;j2fh;lg; where wi is the
wage paid in the ￿rst period if the output is qi in the ￿rst period; and wij is the wage paid in the
second period if the ￿rst period output is qi and the second period output is qj: Her payo⁄ from
a contract, f(wh;wl);(whh;whl;wlh;wll)g; given that it is accepted and the agent exerts high e⁄ort
in both periods is given by
p1[qh ￿ wh + ￿P[p1(qh ￿ whh) + (1 ￿ p1)(ql ￿ whl)]]
+(1 ￿ p1)[ql ￿ wl + ￿P[p1(qh ￿ wlh) + (1 ￿ p1)(ql ￿ wll)]]
When the agent is sophisticated this problem is less complicated relative to the one where the
agent is partially or fully naive. When the agent is naive, the principal has an opportunity to
extract some information rents through deceiving the agent about what e⁄ort level his future self
would pick. This option is not present when the agent is sophisticated.
3 Sophisticated Agent
The principal wants to implement high e⁄ort, e = 1; in both periods. The principal￿ s problem
when she is facing a sophisticated agent is
max
fwi;wijgi;j2fh;lg
p1[qh ￿ wh + ￿P[p1(qh ￿ whh) + (1 ￿ p1)(ql ￿ whl)]]
+(1 ￿ p1)[ql ￿ wl + ￿P[p1(qh ￿ wlh) + (1 ￿ p1)(ql ￿ wll)]]
subject to individual rationality, IR; and the incentive compatibility conditions, IC1 and IC2; for
the two periods.
Start with the second period incentive compatibility constraint, IC2: Given the output realiza-
tion in the ￿rst period, IC2 ensures that the agent exerts high e⁄ort in the second period. Denoting
the utilities from wages with u(wqi) = ui; and u(wqiqj) = uij where i;j 2 fh;lg; IC2 is given by
p1uih + (1 ￿ p1)uil ￿   ￿ p0uih + (1 ￿ p0)uil for i 2 fh;lg
7or
uih ￿ uil ￿
 
p1 ￿ p0
for i 2 fh;lg
The ￿rst period incentive constraint, IC1, that the agent will exert high e⁄ort in the second
period, is given by
p1[uh + ￿￿(p1uhh + (1 ￿ p1)uhl ￿  )] + (1 ￿ p1)[ul + ￿￿(p1ulh + (1 ￿ p1)ull ￿  )] ￿  
￿ p0[uh + ￿￿(p1uhh + (1 ￿ p1)uhl ￿  )] + (1 ￿ p0)[ul + ￿￿(p1ulh + (1 ￿ p1)ull ￿  )]
which can be written as
uh + ￿￿[p1uhh + (1 ￿ p1)uhl] ￿ ul ￿ ￿￿[p1ulh + (1 ￿ p1)ull] ￿
 
p1 ￿ p0
Finally, the individual rationality constraint, IR, is given by
p1[￿￿uh + ￿￿2(p1uhh + (1 ￿ p1)uhl ￿  )] + (1 ￿ p1)[￿￿ul + ￿￿2(p1ulh + (1 ￿ p1)ull ￿  )] ￿   ￿ 0
or
p1[uh + ￿(p1uhh + (1 ￿ p1)uhl)] + (1 ￿ p1)[ul + ￿(p1ulh + (1 ￿ p1)ull)] ￿ (1 + ￿) 
Observe that ￿ enters IC1 but it does not enter IR or IC2. There is no payment made at t = 0:
So from the point of view of t = 0, periods 1 and 2 are e⁄ectively discounted to the contracting
stage at 1 and ￿; respectively: However, agent, being sophisticated, knows that at t = 1 he will
discount period 2 at ￿￿. Hence in IC1; periods 1 and 2 are discounted at 1 and ￿￿; respectively:
Denoting the inverse of the utility function by h(u); the principal￿ s problem becomes
max
fui;uijgi;j2fh;lg
p1[qh ￿ h(uh) + ￿Pfp1(qh ￿ h(uhh)) + (1 ￿ p1)(ql ￿ h(uhl))g]
+(1 ￿ p1)[ql ￿ h(ul) + ￿Pfp1(qh ￿ h(ulh)) + (1 ￿ p1)(ql ￿ h(ull))g]
8subject to
(IR) p1[uh + ￿(p1uhh + (1 ￿ p1)uhl)] + (1 ￿ p1)[ul + ￿(p1ulh + (1 ￿ p1)ull)] ￿ (1 + ￿) 
(IC1) uh + ￿￿[p1uhh + (1 ￿ p1)uhl] ￿ ul ￿ ￿￿[p1ulh + (1 ￿ p1)ull] ￿
 
p1￿p0
(IC2) uih ￿ uil ￿
 
p1￿p0 for i 2 fh;lg
For a given ￿rst period output level qi 2 fqh;qlg; the agent￿ s continuation payo⁄will be p1uih+
(1 ￿ p1)uil ￿  : If the agent has been promised Eui for the second period when the ￿rst period
output realization is qi; then uih and uil are de￿ned to be
p1uih + (1 ￿ p1)uil ￿   = Eui for i 2 fh;lg
Once the principal promises the agent a utility of Eui; the continuation of the optimal contract
for the second period will be given by the solution to the following problem
max
uih;uil
p1(qh ￿ h(uih)) + (1 ￿ p1)(ql ￿ h(uil))
subject to
uih ￿ uil ￿
 
p1 ￿ p0
p1uih + (1 ￿ p1)uil ￿   ￿ Eui
This is a static problem and it is straightforward to show that both constraints bind. Hence,
for a given ￿rst period output, qi; the second period payo⁄s to the agent are
uih =   + Eui + (1 ￿ p1)
 
p1 ￿ p0
uil =   + Eui ￿ p1
 
p1 ￿ p0
Denote the cost of implementing the high e⁄ort level in the second period, given that the
promised second period utility is Eui, by C2(Eui): Denote the continuation value of the contract
9for the principal by V2(Eui): Then
C2(Eui) = p1h(uih) + (1 ￿ p1)h(uil)




Now the principal￿ s problem can be reduced to
max
fui;Euigi2fh;lg
p1[qh ￿ h(uh)] + (1 ￿ p1)[ql ￿ h(uhl)] + ￿P[p1V2(Euh) + (1 ￿ p1)V2(Eul)]
subject to
(IR) p1[uh + ￿Euh] + (1 ￿ p1)[ul + ￿Eul] ￿  
(IC) uh ￿ ul + ￿￿(Euh ￿ Eul) ￿
 
p1￿p0
Note that incentives in the ￿rst period depend on the second period only through Eui; not
through uih or uil. Attaching ￿ to IR and ￿ to IC1 we have the following ￿rst order conditions























(1) and (2) imply that
￿ = p1h0(uh) + (1 ￿ p1)h0(ul) (5)
￿ = p1(1 ￿ p1)(h0(uh) ￿ h0(ul)) (6)








(1 ￿ ￿) (7)








(1 ￿ ￿) (8)
Lemma 1 ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0:
Proof. ￿ > 0 follows immediately from (5). By construction ￿ ￿ 0:Note that ￿ = 0 implies uh = ul
and Euh = Eul: But then IC of the reduced problem is violated.
Henceforth, we will denote a time-consistent agent who has discount factor ￿ with TC￿ and a
sophisticated time-inconsistent agent who has discounting function represented by (1;￿￿;￿￿2) with
SO: We will also use TC￿ and SO as superscripts whenever appropriate.
If the agent is time-consistent, then the conditions (7) and (8) correspond to the relationship
between contingent wages across periods presented in Rogerson (1985). If ￿ = 1; then conditions
(7) and (8) imply h0(u
TC￿








i ) = p1h0(u
TC￿
ih ) + (1 ￿ p1)h0(u
TC￿
il ) = Eqj(h0(u
TC￿
ij ))








ij )) for i 2 fh;lg (9)
This relationship is often referred to as the martingale property. This property says that the
principal intertemporally smooths the agent￿ s rewards over time in a way that the cost of promising
one more unit of utility today is exactly equal to the gain, discounted appropriately, from having
one less unit of utility to promise tomorrow, following any realization of the output. That is, the
marginal cost of rewarding the agent in the ￿rst period for an output realization of qi must be equal
to marginal bene￿t of delaying these awards, discounted appropriately, in the continuation of the
contract given that the ￿rst period output is qi. The principal intertemporally spreads the rewards
to the agent to minimize the cost of implementing high e⁄ort in the ￿rst period.


































So for a time-consistent agent, the principal needs to shift the payments to the ￿rst period for
both output realizations, as the agent gets more impatient.5 However shifting payments to the ￿rst
period for SO is not as easy as it is for TC￿￿: Both TC￿￿ and SO have the same IC1: But for
TC￿￿; IR uses (1;￿￿) discounting; whereas IR for SO uses (1;￿) discounting: That is, for SO the
second period is more important than it is for TC￿￿ which makes it harder for the principal to shift
payments to the ￿rst period for both realizations. This intuition suggests that if the principal shifts
the payments to the ￿rst period for one output realization, then for the other output realization,
she must shift the payments to the second period. Now, we can show that the martingale property
does not hold for a sophisticated agent.













Proof. Since ￿ > 0; (7) and (8) imply h0(uh) > ￿P
￿ C0




2(Eui) = Ej(h0(uij)): Hence ￿h0(uSO
h ) > ￿PEj(h0(uSO
hj )) and C0
2(Eul) = Eqj(h0(ulqj)).
Suppose ￿P = ￿: Then this proposition says that the marginal cost of rewarding the sophisticated
agent for a high level of output in the ￿rst period is higher than the expected marginal cost of
5This is because h
00 > 0:
12promising these awards in the second period given that the ￿rst period output level is high and
symmetrically when the ￿rst period output level is low.
Using the above result, I compare the ￿rst period utility for a time-consistent agent with discount
factor ￿ to that for a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent with (1;￿￿;￿￿2) in the optimal contract
that implements high e⁄ort in both periods.







Proof. See the Appendix.
For a time-inconsistent sophisticated agent with discounting (1;￿￿;￿￿2), the principal should
increase the wage for good performance and decrease it for bad performance, relative to the wage
scheme for a time-consistent agent with a discount factor ￿. That is, it￿ s optimal for the principal
to increase the risk the sophisticated time-inconsistent agent faces in the ￿rst period relative to
the time-consistent agent. The intuition for this result is the following. First set ￿ = 1 for
simplicity. Denote the wage di⁄erential and expected wage di⁄erential with 4u = uh ￿ ul and
4EU = EUh ￿ EUl; respectively: Now suppose that fui;EUjgi;j2fh;lg is the optimal contract for
a time-consistent agent with discount factor ￿ = 1. Then consider the following two options for
the sophisticated agent. In the ￿rst option increase 4u by 41 and keep 4EU the same. In the
second option, increase 4EU by 42 and keep 4u the same. If both options provide the agent
with the same incentives, it should be the case that 41 = ￿ 42 : This is because the sophisticated
agent discounts the second period to the ￿rst period by a factor ￿￿ which is ￿; since ￿ = 1: Hence,
41 < 42: Sophisticated agent￿ s individual rationality constraint will hold with slack under the
￿rst option if it binds under the second option. This is because ￿41 < ￿ 42 : Then, the principal
can increase 4u by 42; and hence provide more incentives and still not violate the individual
rationality.
Now I compare the expected pro￿ts that the principal achieves in the optimal contracts with
a time-consistent agent and with a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent. However, there are two
sensible comparisons. I will compare the expected pro￿t from SO to the expected pro￿t from
TC￿; and to that from TC￿￿: The proposition below compares the expected pro￿t from SO to the
expected pro￿t from TC￿:
13Proposition 3 The expected pro￿t from TC￿ is higher than that from SO:
Proof. Recall the optimization problem when the agent is time-inconsistent and sophisticated.
max
ui;Eui
p1[qh ￿ h(uh)] + (1 ￿ p1)[ql ￿ h(uhl)] + ￿P[p1V2(Euh) + (1 ￿ p1)V2(Eul)]
subject to
(IR) p1[uh + ￿Euh] + (1 ￿ p1)[ul + ￿Eul] ￿  







l } and the Lagrange multipliers are continuously di⁄erentiable func-
tions of ￿:6 Also the non-degenerate constraint quali￿cation holds.7 Hence by the envelope the-
orem, we get
dE￿(￿)
d￿ = ￿￿(Euh ￿ Eul) where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the IC.
Both ￿ and ￿ are positive. We have already shown that Euh > Eul; so
dE￿(￿)
d￿ > 0: Hence,
E￿(￿ = 1) > E￿(￿ < 1):
This result is driven by the fact that the sophisticated time-inconsistent agent discounts the
second period more than the consistent agent does when incentives are considered. Hence the
e⁄ect of the second period on the ￿rst period incentives is lower for SO compared to TC￿: But
both agents discount the second period the same when the contract is evaluated in the contracting
stage. Therefore it￿ s harder to implement high e⁄ort with SO; which gives rise to lower pro￿ts.
A comparison between the expected pro￿t from SO to that from TC￿￿ is given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 The expected pro￿t from TC￿￿ is lower(higher) than that from SO, whenever the
expected second period promised utility, p1Euh+(1￿p1)Eul; is positive for TC￿￿(negative for SO):
Proof. The individual rationality and incentive constraints are as follows
(IR) p1uh + (1 ￿ p1)ul + ￿￿[p1Euh + (1 ￿ p1)Eul] ￿  
(IC) uh ￿ ul + ￿￿(Euh ￿ Eul) ￿
 
p1￿p0
6If the agent is naive, then there is a jump at ￿:
7The rank of the augmented matrix of the constraint system is 2.
14where ￿ = 1 represents SO and ￿ = ￿ represents TC￿￿. We get
dE￿(￿)
d￿ = ￿(p1Euh + (1 ￿ p1)Eul)
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the individual rationality constraint. Note that ￿
does not enter the objective function. If p1Euh + (1 ￿ p1)Eul > 0 at ￿ = ￿, then E￿(￿ = ￿) <
E￿(￿ = 1): That is, the principal prefers SO to TC￿￿: Likewise, if p1Euh + (1 ￿ p1)Eul < 0 at
￿ = 1; then E￿(￿ = ￿) > E￿(￿ = 1); so the principal prefers TC￿￿ to SO:
Whenever the optimal contract promises the time-consistent agent with a discount factor ￿￿
a positive second period expected utility, then it is less costly to implement high e⁄ort with a
sophisticated agent who has a discounting function given by (1;￿￿;￿￿2). This is because the
contract for the consistent agent will be accepted by the inconsistent agent too. That is, the
individual rationality constraint will hold for an inconsistent agent with slack. Then the principal
can alter the wage scheme by appropriately reducing payments for high and low outputs without
violating the incentive constraint. Note that both agents have the same incentive constraint. Hence,
the principal can do better with SO than with TC￿￿; when optimal contract for TC￿￿ promises him
a positive second period expected utility. A positive second period expected utility is an indication
of the fact that it is relatively harder to implement high e⁄ort in both periods. When it is negative
for the sophisticated agent, then the principal can do better with TC￿￿; because TC￿￿ will value
the second period less than SO from the contracting stage point of view. Hence the contract for SO
will make the TC￿￿ to exert high e⁄ort, but with slack in the individually rationality constraint.
Therefore, the principal facing TC￿￿ can implement high e⁄ort with lower wages when the second
period expected utility is negative for SO:
Example 1 Suppose that the inverse utility function is h(u) = u2=2 and for simplicity ￿P = ￿.
For parameters, ￿ = 0:8; ￿ = 0:5; ph = 0:8; pl = 0:2 and   = 1 we get the following approximate
expected costs to implement high e⁄ort in both periods:
TC￿ SO TC￿￿
Expected cost 1.20 1.26 1.32
Hence the principal prefers a TC￿ over SO; and prefers SO over TC￿￿. For TC￿￿; expected second
period promised utility, that is, p1Euh + (1 ￿ p1)Eul; is approximately 0.14 which is positive.
154 Naive Agent
When the agent is naive, his anticipation of his future self￿ s behavior is not correct.8 At t = 0
he believes that he has a discounting function given by (1;b ￿￿;b ￿￿2) where ￿ < b ￿ ￿ 1; so he
underestimates his inconsistency. In the contracting stage, his decision to accept or reject the
contract depends on the set of wages o⁄ered and on the actions he thinks his future selves will
take. Hence IR should be based on his (incorrect) anticipation of his future actions. However IC
should consider only the agent￿ s actual behavior at the e⁄ort stage. This is because the principal
knows agent￿ s exact discounting function and, from t = 1 on, the agent behaves according to his
true ￿: More precisely, the principal will pick a set of wages which makes the agent believe that
his future selves will pick a certain e⁄ort scheme, the arti￿cial one, denoted a: The same wage
scheme will actually implement a potentially di⁄erent e⁄ort scheme, the e⁄ective one, denoted e.
The principal￿ s expected pro￿t will be based on the set of wages and on the e⁄ective e⁄ort schedule,
not on the arti￿cial one. The agent will use the discounting (1;b ￿￿;b ￿￿2) at the contracting stage
expecting that his discounting from t = 1 on will be (1;b ￿￿); however, he will end up behaving
according to (1;￿￿) from t = 1 on.
There are two sets of arti￿cial e⁄ort levels. One is the e⁄ort schedule that the agent believes at
t = 0, his future selves (the self at t = 1 and the self at t = 2) will pick at t = 1 and t = 2, denoted
fa1;(ai
2)i2fh;lgg. The other is the e⁄ort schedule that the agent thinks at t = 1, his future self will
pick at t = 2, denoted f(b ai
2)i2fh:lgg: Since there is no further time-inconsistency between t = 1 and
t = 2, we have b ai
2 = ei
2 for i 2 fh;lg: By the same argument, the e⁄ective second period e⁄ort will
be the same as the arti￿cial second period e⁄ort, from t = 0 point of view. That is, ai
2 = ei
2 for
i 2 fh;lg: Therefore, the only arti￿cial e⁄ort level that matters is a1:
The principal has an opportunity to manipulate the agent￿ s naivete by making him believe that
his future self at t = 1 exerts no e⁄ort, but when he actually arrives at t = 1 he exerts high e⁄ort
as the principal desires. That is, the principal may set a contract such that a1 = 0 but e1 = 0: In
this case, the principal￿ s problem is
min
fui;Euigi2fh;lg
p1[h(uh) + ￿PC2(Euh)] + (1 ￿ p1)[h(ul) + ￿PC2(Eul)]
8Here, we consider a naive agent who, looking at the contract, does not infer anything about his future self￿ s type.
Instead he sticks to his prior belief about the future self.
16subject to
(IR0) p0[uh + ￿Euh] + (1 ￿ p0)[ul + ￿Eul] ￿ 0
(IC0




e) uh ￿ ul + ￿￿(Euh ￿ Eul) ￿
 
p1￿p0
IR0 ensures that the agent accepts the contract given that he believes that his self at t = 1 will
pick low e⁄ort. IC0
a convinces the agent, from t = 0 perspective, that he will choose low e⁄ort at
t = 1. Finally, IC0
e ensures that when the agent actually arrives at t = 1, he changes his mind and
picks high e⁄ort.
Attaching ￿ to the IR0, ￿a to the IC0
a and ￿e to the IC0

























￿￿e ￿ b ￿￿a
1 ￿ p1
Alternatively, the principal can simply choose to implement high e⁄ort in both periods, without
trying to make the agent believe that his future self will pick low e⁄ort at t = 1. That is, a1 = 1:
In this case, the principal￿ s problem is
min
fui;Euigi2fh;lg
p1[h(uh) + ￿PC2(Euh)] + (1 ￿ p1)[h(ul) + ￿PC2(Eul)]
subject to
(IR1) p1[uh + ￿Euh] + (1 ￿ p1)[ul + ￿Eul] ￿ 0
(IC1




e) uh ￿ ul + ￿￿(Euh ￿ Eul) ￿
 
p1￿p0
Having constructed the principal￿ s problem for both cases, namely for a1 = 0 and a1 = 1, I
now show that in the case where high e⁄ort is highly valuable to the principal in both periods, the
degree of the agent￿ s misperception does not matter.
17Lemma 2 Suppose that the principal faces a naive agent with 0 < ￿ < b ￿ ￿ 1, and that she wants
to implement high e⁄ort in both periods. Then, the optimal contract does not depend on the degree
of agent￿ s misperception, b ￿ ￿ ￿:
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the principal is trying to convince the agent that his future self will pick low e⁄ort, she
has to write a contract which has a higher value when low e⁄ort is exerted, from the perspective of
the naive agent who expects to discount the last period less than he will. So the contract must have
a relatively lower second period promised utility when the ￿rst period output is high compared to
the second period promised utility when the ￿rst period output is low. This is captured by the fact
that Euh ￿ Eul: Since the agent at t = 0 highly values the second period, such a scheme makes
him think that he should pick low e⁄ort in the ￿rst period. But, the same contract must also make
sure that the self at t = 1 actually picks high e⁄ort. So the principal must use the ￿rst period
utilities to ensure that. Therefore, the ￿rst period utility when the output is high is higher than
the ￿rst period utility when the output is low. That is, uh > ul:
When writing a contract with a1 = 0, the principal will ignore b ￿, because a wage scheme that
makes an agent with b ￿ believe that his future self will pick low e⁄ort is also going to make any
other agent with e ￿ > ￿ believe that his future self will pick low e⁄ort. Since the e⁄ective e⁄ort
level will be picked through the incentives from the t = 1 point of view, in which b ￿ does not show
up, the optimal wage scheme is the solution to the problem given for a1 = 0 with the two binding
constraints, IC0
e and IR0, with Euh ￿ Eul and uh > ul: This solution satis￿es IC0
a, with slack, for
any b ￿ with b ￿ > ￿: That is, in the case where the principal tries to deceive the agent, she writes a
contract based on the true incentives and the individual rationality for a1 = 0: But, this contract
makes any naive agent believe that his future self will pick low e⁄ort.
For the contract with a1 = 1; the analysis is relatively straightforward. Any wage scheme that
implements high e⁄ort and ensures that the agent believes his future self will pick high e⁄ort will
de￿nitely make any other naive agent with di⁄erent degree of misperception believe that his future
self will pick high e⁄ort. This is because for a1 = 1; we have Euh ￿ Eul: The principal, o⁄ering
the same contract, will be able to make all naive agents with di⁄erent degrees of naivete believe
that they will choose a1 in the ￿rst period.
18When Euh 6= Eul; we can see that IC0
e binds but IC0
a does not, in Figure 1 below. The graph
is drawn on a uh;ul space given the optimal Euh and Eul: Note that Euh < Eul: Both IC0
e and
IC0
a have slope equal to 1. IR has slope equal to ￿
p0











1￿p0; the isocost curve should be
steeper than IR at the optimum. That is possible only when IC0
e binds and IC0
a does not.
Figure 1
Having established the result that the optimal contract that implements high e⁄ort in both
periods does not depend on the degree of the agent￿ s misperception, I turn to the question of
whether the principal is better o⁄ by choosing a1 = 0 rather than a1 = 1: When a1 = 1; the
contract will be the same as the optimal contract in the sophisticated agent case. If principal,
facing a naive agent, can do better with a1 = 0 rather than a1 = 1, then she will be better o⁄ with
a naive agent rather than a sophisticated agent. Otherwise, naivete and sophistication will make
no di⁄erence at all. Therefore, the question whether the principal can do better convincing the
agent that his future self will pick low e⁄ort, but eventually implementing high e⁄ort, is equivalent
to the question of whether the principal is better o⁄ with a naive agent or a sophisticated agent.
Proposition 5 If the principal implements high e⁄ort in both periods, she is indi⁄erent between
facing a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent and facing a naive time-inconsistent agent.
Proof. Showing that a1 = 1 is optimal will prove this result because in this case, the contract for
sophisticated agent and the contract for naive agent with a1 = 1 are going to be exactly the same.
So I only need to show that
The cost of implementing high e⁄ort in both periods with a1 = 1 is smaller than the cost with
a1 = 0: To see this, ￿rst note that ICa does not bind for either problem with a1 = 1 and a0 = 0




p1[h(uh) + ￿PC2(Euh)] + (1 ￿ p1)[h(ul) + ￿PC2(Eul)]
19subject to
(IR) (p1 ￿ ￿)[uh + ￿Euh] + (1 ￿ p1 + ￿)[ul + ￿Eul] = 0
(ICe) uh ￿ ul + ￿￿(Euh ￿ Eul) ￿
 
p1￿p0 = 0
If ￿ = 0; then the problem above is exactly the one for a1 = 1: If ￿ = p1￿p0; then it is the problem
that corresponds to the case with a1 = 0: Then we have,
dEC(￿)
d￿ = ￿(uh￿ul+￿(Euh￿Eul)); where
￿ is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the IR; and EC(￿) is the expected cost in the relevant
problem. We have already shown that uh ￿ ul + ￿(Euh ￿ Eul) > 0 for the sophisticated agent.
So, this derivative evaluated at ￿ = 0 gives us a positive value. Therefore the cost will be higher
for the case with ￿ = p1 ￿ p0; that is, for the case with a1 = 0: Thus, a1 = 1 is optimal. The
contract for the sophisticated agent and the contract for naive agent with a1 = 1 are exactly the
same. Thus, the principal is indi⁄erent between facing a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent and
facing a naive time-inconsistent agent.
This is particularly striking because with a naive time-inconsistent agent the principal has
the power to manipulate the agent through his misperception. However, such an opportunity to
manipulate does not provide the principal with higher pro￿ts. In fact, the principal chooses not to
deceive the agent at all.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyzed a repeated moral hazard problem with a time-inconsistent agent. To
capture time-inconsistency, I assumed ￿￿-preferences which is simple enough and widely used in
the literature. I posed the following question: Would a risk neutral principal prefer to face a time-
consistent agent or a time-inconsistent agent? To answer this question, ￿rst I looked at the case
where the time-inconsistent agent is fully aware of his inconsistency. I showed that the optimal
contract for the time-inconsistent agent, relative to the optimal contract for the time-consistent
agent, has a higher reward for high performance and a lower reward when the output is low, in the
￿rst period. The principal is better o⁄facing a time-consistent agent with a discount factor ￿; than
facing a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent with discounting (1;￿￿;￿￿2): She is worse o⁄ facing
a time-consistent agent with a discount factor ￿￿; than facing a sophisticated time-inconsistent
agent with discounting (1;￿￿;￿￿2) if the promised second period expected utility is positive for the
20consistent agent.
I also looked at the case where the inconsistent agent is partially or fully naive. That is, he
misperceives his inconsistency. The principal can consider two possible contracts: One contract
tries to convince the agent that he is going to choose low e⁄ort in the future but when the time
arrives actually induces high e⁄ort, while the other contract does not try to deceive the agent. I
show that the latter contract is optimal, so the principal prefers not to try to deceive the agent.
This implies that the principal is indi⁄erent between facing a naive agent and facing a sophisticated
agent.
I have assumed that the naive agent does not have the ability to infer something about his
inconsistency from the contract. A more concrete way of modelling the problem at hand would be
by considering a naive agent who can update his beliefs about his future behavior based on the
contract. This obviously is a more involved problem and is an open question for now.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall IR and IC of the reduced problem for sophisticated agent.
(IR) p1[uSO
h + ￿(EuSO
h )] + (1 ￿ p1)[uSO
l + ￿(EuSO
l )] ￿  
(IC) uSO
h + ￿￿[EuSO




Multiplying IC with 1 ￿ p1; and adding it up with IR we get
uSO
h =  (1 +
1 ￿ p1
p1 ￿ p0
) ￿ ￿[(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)p1)EuSO
h + (1 ￿ (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)p1))EuSO
l ]
Multiplying IC with p1; and subtracting it from IR we get
uSO
l =  (1 ￿
p1
p1 ￿ p0
) ￿ ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)p1EuSO
h + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p1)EuSO
l ]
21And corresponding utilities for the time-consistent agent are
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h + ￿[(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)p1)EuSO
h + (1 ￿ (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)p1))EuSO






l + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)p1EuSO
h + (1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p1)EuSO





Note that 1 > ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)p1 > 0 and 1 > (1 ￿ ￿)p1 > 0: Since EuSO
h > EuSO















Now using proposition 1 above we have
h0(uSO

















De￿ne g = (h0)￿1: Note that g and C0
2(:) are increasing functions.10 Therefore
uSO

















9One can easily see this from equations (3) and (4) by using the fact that ￿ > 0; ￿ > 0 and C
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h00(g(:)) > 0 since h
00 > 0: To see that C
0
2(:) is increasing:
C2(Eui) = phh(uqih) + (1 ￿ ph)h(uqil)
= phh(  + Eui +
(1 ￿ ph) 
ph ￿ pl
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2 is an increasing function. Now suppose uSO
h ￿ u
TC￿




h , whereas (12) implies (g￿C0
2)(EuSO
h ) < (g￿C0
2)(Eu
TC￿




h . Hence uSO
h > u
TC￿
h : And uSO
l < u
TC￿
l follows similarly using (11) and (13).11
Proof of Lemma 2. Case 1: Suppose a1 = 0. IC0
a and IC0
e together imply ￿b ￿(Euh ￿ Eul) ￿
￿￿(Euh ￿ Eul): Hence Euh ￿ Eul. If Euh = Eul = Eu; then the optimal {uh;ul;Eu} will
solve the following problem
min
uh;ul;Eu
p1h(uh) + (1 ￿ p1)h(ul) + ￿PC2(Eu)
subject to
p0uh + (1 ￿ p0)ul + ￿Eu ￿ 0
uh ￿ ul =
 
p1 ￿ p0
The second condition is directly implied by plugging Euh = Eul = Eu into IC0
a and IC0
e:
b ￿ does not enter the calculation. If Euh < Eul; then both IC0￿ s cannot be binding. Both
cannot be non-binding as well. If they are both non-binding then ￿a = ￿e = 0: But then






p1(1￿p1)) < 0 since p0 < p1: Hence uh ￿ ul < 0; which
violates IC0
e since Euh < Eul as well: Therefore, one of the IC0
a and IC0
e should be binding
and the other should be non-binding. Suppose IC0
a binds and IC0
e does not. Then ￿a > 0
and ￿e = 0: But then we get h0(uh) ￿ h0(ul) = ￿(
p0￿p1
p1(1￿p1)) ￿ ￿a( 1
p1(1￿p1)) < 0 since p0 < p1
and ￿a > 0: Again uh ￿ ul < 0; which again violates IC0
e since Euh < Eul: Hence, if there
is a solution to the problem with a1 = 0, it should be the case that IC0
e binds and IC0
a does
not. Therefore b ￿ does not enter into the calculation of the solution.
Case2: Suppose a1 = 1: In this case Euh ￿ Eul:12 If Euh = Eul, then similarly b ￿ drops
from the calculation. If Euh > Eul; then trivially IC1
e binds and IC1



































Since ￿; ￿a and ￿e are both positive, C
0(Euh) ￿ C
0(Eul): That is, Euh ￿ Eul:
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